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Amending Title VII to Eradicate Discrimination based on Religious Apparel

Rabia Hassan

Introduction:
Sex-based discrimination in the workplace is not novel or commonplace. After decades
of struggle, the Federal government finally recognized that discrimination in the workplace was a
severe and pervasive problem that was repugnant to the ideals espoused in the U.S. Constitution.
Attempting to remedy this, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, (“Title
VII”)1, prohibiting discrimination in the workplace based upon classifications of sex, race, color,
religion or national origin. While there is undoubted consensus that Title VII revolutionized and
served as a “linchpin”2 of employment discrimination law, the shortcomings present in the
legislation became readily apparent.
First, the protections of Title VII only apply to “employers with 15 employees or more.”3
While this targets large to mid-size businesses and brings them under the purview of the law to
prevent employment discrimination, small businesses and domestic workers are not covered.4
Second, the application of Title VII to regulate and police unlawful employment practices and
employment discrimination occurs through disparate treatment and disparate impact, both of

1

See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000 et seq. (LexisNexis 2012).
See KATHERINE T. BARTLETT & DEBORAH L. RHODE, GENDER and LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY
61 (Aspen, 5th ed. 2010) (describing the central and vital role accorded to Title VII in employment discrimination
law, both on the Federal and state level). Each state has an anti-discrimination law which is modeled on part, if not
completely on Title VII. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §10:5-1 (West 2012).
3
See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (LexisNexis 2012).
4
See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 505-506 (2006); Wein v. Sun, 936 F. Supp. 282, 283 (E.D.Pa.
1996).
2

which only address forms of discrimination which fall within the specific categories set out in
the statute.5 In general disparate treatment focuses on banning employment discrimination
which occurs through the “inconsistent application of rules and policies to one group over
another,” usually members of a protected class.6 Disparate impact instead focuses on outlawing
legislation and policies which “results when rules applied to all employees have a different and
more inhibiting effect on…minority groups than on the majority.”7 Title VII allows for plaintiffs
to bring employment discrimination claims based on sex. However, if a plaintiff is unable to
demonstrate that an employer’s actions are motivated by an intent to discriminate against a
particular sex, or have an impact on a particular sex, their Title VII claim will most likely fail.
Discrimination claims which do not neatly fall within the “disparate treatment” or
“disparate impact” theories of Title VII, cannot be litigated against under Title VII. Therefore, a
vast array of plaintiffs are denied Title VII remedies based on otherwise legitimate claims of
employment discrimination based on the categories specified under Title VII. This is
particularly apparent in appearance discrimination claims.8 While women have always faced
some form of appearance discrimination,9 women who constitute minorities face this to a greater
degree, not only socially but also in the workplace, as they are “[h]eld to idealized standards of
Anglo-American features and to [such] grooming standards.”10 Holding women of minority
groups to such standards in the United States, enables employers to discriminate against them on

5

See id. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k) (LexisNexis 2012).
See Equal Employment Opportunity Terminology, U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECS. ADMIN., (Dec. 04, 2012),
http://www.archives.gov/eeo/terminology.html.
7
See id.
8
See infra Part II.
9
See Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2009) (arguing that
discrimination based upon appearance is invidious and as pervasive as other forms of discrimination prohibited by
Congress, because it stems from homogenous societal norms of what is ‘attractive’).
10
See id. at 1053.
6
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the basis of religion and national origin but without being reprimanded because discrimination
based on appearance does not fall within the scope of Title VII.
The gaps within the framework of Title VII, while problematic in general, prove
especially problematic during times of social upheaval, such as after September 11, 2001.11
After 9/11, the backlash against Muslims and those who appeared to “look” Muslim increased.
This occurred in the employment context as employers further regulated not only security
clearance and access employees would receive based on their name, but also their dress
standards.12 While issues of national origin and religion are relevant, sex was particularly
impacted in appearance-based policies initiated by employers, by the sole fact that a majority of
those targeted were women. Given the compelling argument articulated by Deborah Rhodes
regarding the overarching discrimination based on appearance, both men and women face, albeit
to a larger degree women, this paper examines appearance discrimination in the context of a
watershed event, such as 9/11.
The political and social ramifications after 9/11 not only give credence to the presence of
appearance discrimination, but also point to the deficiencies in Title VII, as the latter fails to
address new forms of employment discrimination which discriminate against individuals through
a combination of traits.13 Because sex stereotyping informs the workplace environment,

11

See Sandra R. McCandless & Khoa Ngo, Employment Discrimination on the Basis of National Origin and
Religion in the Post 9/11 Era, A.B.A., Jul. 2008, at 2.
12
See id. at 4-8.
13
See infra Part III, (discussing the theory of Intersectionality as it pertains to race and gender; see, e,g.,
DeGraffenreid v. General Motors, 413 F. Supp 142, 142-145 (E.D. Mo. 1976); Moore v., Hughes Helicopters, 708
F.2d 475, 475-486 (9th Cir. 1983). While Courts have discussed whether or not a viable nexus exists between race
and gender, this paper argues that an equally compelling nexus exists between religion and gender. Recognizing
appearance discrimination as a viable form of discrimination is necessary in order to demonstrate the interaction
between the religious and sex-based identities of individuals).
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appearance discrimination is on the rise and particularly against Muslims post 9/11.14 This paper
proposes that one way to restrict the impact of appearance discrimination and curb the use of
new forms of discrimination is amend Title VII. The amendment should prohibit the use of
religious apparel by employers as a factor in designing standards of professionalism. The
amendment would recognize the pervasiveness of appearance discrimination and thus widen the
scope of anti-discrimination law to better protect the rights of minority groups.

Part I:

Title VII and Its Shortcomings
Title VII assesses unlawful employment discrimination through the paradigm of two

arguably restrictive theories: disparate treatment and disparate impact. Disparate treatment
discrimination targets “employment rules or decisions that treat an employee less favorably than
others because of the employee’s race, sex, religion or national origin.”15 In the context of sexbased employment discrimination, disparate treatment cases generally appear as pretext16 or
mixed-motive claims17, where the burden of proof is always on the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the negative employment decision directed by the employer towards the employee, was
overwhelmingly because of the employee’s sex.

14

See McCandless & Ngo, supra note 12, at 3-4.
See BARTLETT & RHODE, supra note 2, at 61-62.
16
See id. at 63-70 (indicating the classic treatment of pre-text disparate treatment cases by the Federal Courts
through Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992). Once a plaintiff asserts that an
employer’s adverse action was because of the employee’s sex, in order to shift the burden back to the plaintiff, the
employer must demonstrate that the employment decision stems from a non-discriminatory reason. In order to rebut
the presumption created by the employer, the plaintiff must then show that the non-discriminatory reason is but a
“pretext” for the underlying or real motive of sex-discrimination).
17
See BARTLETT & RHODE, supra note 2, at 62 and 70-74 (showing the U.S. Supreme Court’s treatment of a
mixed-motive disparate treatment through Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, U.S. 228 (1989). Once a plaintiff asserts
that an employer’s employment decision was based on discriminatory and non-discriminatory reasons, the employee
must further show that it would have taken the same course of action).
15

4

Although many employment discrimination cases are largely the result of sex
stereotyping, it is not prohibited by the Federal Courts in either a disparate treatment analysis or
a disparate impact analysis.18 In the Court’s dissent in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, along with Justices Kennedy and Scalia noted that even though
“Title VII creates no independent cause of action for sex stereotyping…evidence of sexstereotyping…is relevant [because it goes towards affirming or disproving] discriminatory intent
[and thus whether or not] the discrimination caused the plaintiff harm.”19 Proving discriminatory
intent in disparate treatment cases is difficult without giving considerable weight to sexstereotypes, other than in cases where the discrimination is so pervasive and apparent.
Under the disparate impact theory of employment discrimination, a plaintiff must show
“that a facially neutral job requirement or policy disproportionately affects women and that this
requirement or policy is not related to job performance.”20 In these instances, there is no
requirement for a plaintiff to demonstrate that the policy reflects discriminatory intent on the part
of the employer. In order to refute disparate impact claims, an employer needs to either refute
the claim by presenting facts supporting the policy’s nexus with job performance, or by
demonstrating that the facially neutral job requirement is justified as a business necessity.21
Within disparate treatment theory, sex-stereotyping is also a problem. First, employers
can assert a bona fide occupational qualification22 and easily shift the burden of proof back onto
the plaintiff. Second, in order to assess whether or not policies placed unequal burdens on a

18

See Equal Employment Opportunity Terminology, supra note 6 and 7.
See BARTLETT & RHODE, supra note 6, at74.
20
See id. at 61-62.
21
See BARTLETT & RHODE, supra note 2, at 61-62.
22
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009 (stating generally that a bona fide occupational qualification is an
affirmative defense to discrimination where a sex-based requirement or restriction is permitted because it is essential
to the business operations of an employer).
19

5

group based on their sex, invidious forms of discrimination such as appearance discrimination
cannot be adequately addressed.23 In Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating, Inc., the Court held that
the employer’s policy requiring female employees to wear make-up did not constitute sex-based
employment discrimination under Title VII.24 The majority justified its reasoning by stating that
the policy did not “[i]ndicate any discriminatory or sexually stereotypical intent on the part of
Harrah’s [and instead conformed with] an overall apparel, appearance and grooming policy that
applies largely to both men and women.”25
The dissent disagreed, asserting instead that the grooming policy implemented by
Harrah’s, the “Personal Best” program, placed an unequal burden on the plaintiff, as it was
motivated by the employer’s sex stereotyping, reflective sex stereotyping held by society.26
Furthermore, the dissent considered that “Harrah’s…policy that required women to conform to a
sex stereotype by wearing full make up [to be] sufficient ‘direct evidence’ of discrimination.”27
The dissent highlighted the nuanced form of sex discrimination exercised by Harrah’s, which the
majority had failed to recognize. Harrah’s “Personal Best” grooming policy did in fact
disproportionately impact women as opposed to men.
The separate requirements, viewed individually, indicate broader gender-stereotyping
which is dangerous because it suggests “[t]o the public that [without such a grooming policy]
women would be unable to achieve a neat, attractive and [therefore] professional appearance.”28
In addition, while men and women are both held to community-based grooming standards, the
23

See BARTLETT & RHODE, supra note 2, at 83-91(asserting that disparate impact of employer policies are viewed
in the context of overall community standards as viewed in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d
1104 (9th Cir. 2006)).
24
See BARTLETT & RHODE, supra note 25, at 87-88.
25
See id. at 88.
26
See BARTLETT & RHODE, supra note 25, at 88-89.
27
See id. at 89.
28
See BARTLETT & RHODE, supra note 2, at 90.
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fact that both must maintain neat and attractive appearances does not equally burden each sex, to
achieve such an outcome. As discussed in the second dissent “…the application of makeup is an
intricate and painstaking process that requires considerable time and care [unlike] the time it
would take a man to shave.”29 Requiring women to undergo a complete transformation of their
facial appearance in order to comply with an employer’s grooming standards is both burdensome
and demeaning, given that the judicial system is affirming blatant sex-stereotyping in the
workplace.
In sum, the current structure of Title VII and its application place an unequal burden on
women. Sex stereotyping has different consequences and expectations for women and men,
which is neither cured under a disparate theory framework nor a disparate impact framework.
This results in women facing a new more nuanced form of discrimination, which Title VII does
not protect against: appearance based discrimination.

Part II:

Appearance Discrimination as an Invidious Form of Discrimination

The persistence of appearance discrimination best shown in Jespersen v. Harrah’s
Operating Company, Inc., is reflective of the deficiencies present in the overall structure of Title
VII. By intentionally failing to recognize appearance discrimination as a separate and pervasive
form of sex-based discrimination, the judiciary legitimizes the stereotype that women’s faces,
unlike men’s faces, are “…incomplete and…unprofessional” without full makeup.”30 A

29

See BARTLETT & RHODE, supra note 2, at 91 (asserting that while both applying makeup and shaving constitute
daily rituals performed by both women and men, the fact that they constitute daily rituals is the extent of their
similarities. Any comparison conducted to examine the burden experienced by each sex in carrying out the
abovementioned tasks would not be accurate, because applying makeup every day is more time and labor intensive
compared to shaving).
30
See id. at 88.
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discussion on appearance discrimination is relevant because it informs community standards and
expectations, regarding professional appearance and conduct in a workplace environment. The
legal consequences of such expectations contribute to the proliferation of new forms of
employment discrimination.
The Significance of Appearance in Forming Community Biases:
Discrimination based upon appearance is “[a]t least widespread as other forms of
prohibited bias.”31 It offends both equal opportunity and individual dignity when used to
discriminate against individuals in the workplace.32 Not only do such stereotypes “…reflect
overbroad or inaccurate generalizations [but] they [are] self-perpetuating.”33 Therefore, group
disadvantages become compounded and are reinforced. In particular, members of minority
groups, faced with discrimination based on their appearance, are “[p]revent[ed] from developing
their full capacities,” on top of discrimination already directed towards them as a result of either
their race, gender, class, disability or sexual orientation.34 As Rhode asserts, studies demonstrate
that the appearance standards to which minorities are held and considered ideal are AngloAmerican features.35 Cultural standards or hallmarks of beauty such as African American
weaves or other hairstyle choices are therefore no longer recognized as attractive or professional,
as they are not considered “neat or well-groomed.”36 Under Rhode’s conception of appearance

31

See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1060.
See id. at 1050-1051 (stating that “…in many contexts, appearance bears no relationship to competence and
discrimination on that basis undermines values pertaining to both efficiency and equity”).
33
See Rhode, supra, note 6, at 1051.
34
See ,e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L. J. 2313, 2359-2360 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, The
Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2428-2429 (1994).
35
See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1053 (quoting Tracey Owens Patton, Hey Girl, Am I More Than My Hair?: African
American Women and Their Struggles with Beauty, Body Image and Hair, 18 NWSA J. 24, 25 (2006)).
36
See, e.g,. Imani Perry, Buying White Beauty, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 579 (2006); Hollins v, Atlantic Co.,
188 F.3d 652, 655-657 (6th Cir. 1999) (where hairstyles now had to be approved by an African American
employee’s white supervisor and only sanctioned hairstyles would be considered “neat”. The sanctioned hairstyles
were those already worn by white women workers).
32
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discrimination, Harrah’s “Personal Best” grooming policy would constitute unlawful
employment discrimination under the theory of appearance discrimination, because it classifies
attractiveness, professionalism and self-worth based on one set of preferences.37 What is
particularly troubling and dangerous about discrimination based on appearance is that it creates
biases which serve as the basis for legal treatment or restriction of individuals, reflecting either
an affirmation or disapproval for such choices, which have punitive ramifications.38 Biases
inform and affect the treatment of individuals in the workplace, as innate feelings and
assumptions cannot be relegated to the private sphere.39
Appearance Policies Reflect an Overall Preference towards the Anglo-American Look:
Employer policies regarding grooming and appearance standards not only reflect an
inherent bias about appearance, but also about how appearance informs other characteristics held
by workers, such as professionalism or competence. Despite the multiculturalism and diversity
in the workplace, Anglo-American appearance ideals have become the norm and therefore
constitute the appearance of the ideal worker. Appearance discrimination therefore also
perpetuates the idea of cultural and religious diversity as being the antithesis of professionalism.
This is problematic in that it not only discriminates based upon one, single and restrictive notion
of professionalism, but “[r]equires conforming to conventional norms [that] infringe [on]

37

See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1035-1036 (asserting that regardless of variety of cultures which comprise the United
States, “the globalization of mass media and information technology has brought an increasing convergence in the
standards of attractiveness”).
38
See id. at 1037-1039 (stating how bias’ on appearance become ingrained from childhood and persist into
adulthood. Ramifications to individual choices and beliefs occur when such bias’ “skew judgments about
competence and job performance”); David Landy & Harold Sigall, Beauty is Talent: Task Evaluation as a Function
of the Performer’s Physical Attractiveness, 29 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 299 (1974); Nicole
39
See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Sex Pus Age Discrimination: Protecting Older Women Workers, 81 DENV. U. L.
REV. 79, 91 (2003) (stating that bias’ towards older women workers led to ageism in the workplace and reinforcing
the idea that bias’ permeate into the public sphere).

9

individual autonomy.”40 While some individuals may not view their appearance or matters
relating to grooming as vehicles of self-expression or reflective of core-held beliefs, several
individuals, a majority of whom constitute minority populations in the United States, view
outward appearance as “[c]entral to their personal…religious, racial and gender affiliations”.41 A
failure on the part of employers to accommodate self-expression by regulating the appearance of
individuals, impinges on their rights of self expression given in the Constitution and is both de
jure and de facto unlawful employment discrimination.42

Lack of Legal Remedies for Appearance-based Discrimination Claims:
Challenges brought against both cultural and sex-stereotyping fail however, because of
the narrow and restrictive view of the categories of discrimination. The case of Rogers v.
American Airlines, highlights the need to reform and re-conceptualize the federal law’s
understanding of discrimination in order to account for discrimination based on appearance.
Doing so would in turn, curtail unlawful employment discrimination perpetrated by employers
which go unprosecuted because they do not conform to the standard forms of discrimination
recognized by Title VII. In Rogers v. American Airlines, the Southern District of New York held
that the airline’s prohibition on braided cornrows did not constitute either race or sex
discrimination as “…the plaintiff had not demonstrated ‘that an all-braided hair style is worn
exclusively or predominantly by black people.’”43 By failing to recognize the significance or
importance of braided hair to the African American woman employee, the Court denied the
40

See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1058 (re-asserting the idea espoused by Susan Sontag that individual self-expression
stems from closely held beliefs).
41
See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1058.
42
See ,e.g., Anita L. Allen, Undressing Difference: The Hijab in the West, 23 BERKLEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 208,
211-216 (2008) (indicating the importance of the headscarf to the cultural and religious identity of Muslims and
showing it is akin to the yarmulke to those of the Jewish religion).
43
See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1059 (citing the majority’s holding in Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F.Supp. 229
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
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plaintiff’s cultural beliefs and right to self-expression solely on the grounds that she could not
demonstrate that hair braiding was an exclusive or dominant preference of African American
females and therefore could not qualify as a closely-held belief.44 This case is reflective of the
general treatment given to claims which do not neatly fit within the already prescribed categories
of discrimination. In claims involving grooming policies which impact the beliefs and practices
of religious groups for instance, Courts have been increasingly deferential to the business
justifications provided by employers, in denying employee requests for accommodations to wear
head coverings (hijabs) or maintain beards.45 The failure to “question the sex stereotypes
underlying conventional ‘community standards’ and to demand a reasonable business
justification from employers,’” allows for appearance discrimination claims to persist.46
Employer Justifications for Implementing Appearance-based Policies and Why Such
Justifications Fail:
The general argument used to legitimize discrimination based on appearance relies on
“[e]mployee attractiveness [which is] an effective selling point and [are] part of an employer’s
strategy to ‘brand’ the seller through a certain look.”47 Employers who have brought forth such
an argument essentially articulate a standard of beauty which captures the “classic American”
look.48 Such policies blatantly constitute race, ethnic, sex and age-based discrimination and are

44

See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1059 (citing Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231-232); see e.g. Paulette M. Caldwell, A
Hairpiece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 41 DUKE L.J. 365, 371-372 (criticizing the Court’s
upholding of employer policies which banned hair pieces in the workplace because it symbolizes the legitimization
of sex and race-based discriminatory policies based upon a failure to understand the cultural importance of
appearance).
45
See e.g. EEOC v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 02 C 6172 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2002) (order of resolution); EEOC v. Fed.
Express Corp., CV100-50 (S.D. Ga. May 24, 2001) (consent decree); see generally infra Part III.
46
See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1077.
47
See id. at 1064.
48
See Steven Greenhouse, Going for the Look, but Risking Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2003, at A12
(where Abercrombie & Fitch’s policy of hiring workers that fit its look policy rendered its sales staff being
composed of “young, trendy and not too ethnic” workers); see also Steven Greenhouse, Abercrombie & Fitch Bias
Case is Settled, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2004, at A16 (indicating that due to its discriminatory hiring policy, based on
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thus prohibited under federal law. However, unless an employer’s policy blatantly discriminates
based on the aforementioned categories, Courts are unlikely to find that employers violated Title
VII, even if “look” policies are based upon double standards or serve to perpetuate them, even
when such policies bear no apparent relationship to job performance.49
Critics who oppose recognizing appearance discrimination as a viable form of
discrimination, state additionally, that it is too amorphous to police. Their main concern is that
appearance and grooming practices are extremely subjective, making it near impossible for
Courts to determine when an employer is discriminating based upon such practices.50 Increased
litigation costs, enhanced judicial activism and the detrimental cost to “truly” invidious forms of
discrimination51 are concerns which critics feel demonstrate that more harm than good will occur
by amending Title VII to recognize appearance discrimination or concomitantly, authorizing
appearance-discrimination statutes. In fact, several federal judges such as Richard Posner, have
asserted that the “law on sex stereotypes has already ‘gone off the tracks’ in reasoning,”52 and
“federal judges have too much to do to become embroiled in petty disputes about where women
can and can’t wear pants.”53 The aforementioned remarks trivialize the issue and therefore fail to
recognize that while certain employer “look” policies can be trivial, when such policies take into
account stereotypes and inhibit individuals self-expression based upon their race, religion or
ethnicity, their constitutional rights are violated.

its appearance policy, Abercrombie & Fitch was forced to settle claims against it for race discrimination after it
agreed to “integrate its staff and advertisements”).
49
See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1065 (specifically alluding to Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104,
1106-1107 (9th Cir. 2006)).
50
See id. at 1068-1069 (asserting the holding of the Court in Alam v. Reno Hilton Corp., 819 F. Supp. 905, 914 (D.
Nev. 1993) where it stated that “no Court can be expected to create a standard on such vagaries as attractiveness”).
51
See Rhode supra note 6, at 1069.
52
See id. (quoting Judge Posner in Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1066-1067 (7th Cir.
2003)).
53
See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1069 (quoting Rappaport v. Katz, 380 F. Supp. 808, 811-812 (S.D.N.Y.1974)).
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Those who criticize appearance discrimination legislation put forth additional arguments,
all of which are not sustainable. First, these critics argue that “[p]rejudice based on appearance
is more natural and harder to eradicate than other forms of bias,”54 which studies demonstrate is
a false assumption.55 Shifts in popular opinion have been driven in part by legal interventions
regarding other forms of discrimination, which previously were considered commonplace in
society.56 There is therefore no reason to assume that initiatives prohibiting appearance
discrimination would not cause similar shifts in social thinking and perceptions.
Second, they argue that “[p]rohibiting [appearance] discrimination would erode support
for other civil rights legislation.”57 This argument loses legal weight because in cities, counties
and states which passed ordinances prohibiting appearance discrimination, there were no severe
repercussions or mass frivolous legal claims brought forth.58 In fact in one of the only states
which passed a statutory ordinance prohibiting appearance discrimination, Michigan, out of 30
complaints of violations of appearance discrimination, only 1 went to Court.59 At a minimum,
by recognizing appearance discrimination as a form of unlawful discrimination, the law would
“…provide a forum to air injustice [that] can be a powerful catalyst for social change”.60 It may
take time for legislation to translate into changing attitudes, but formally prohibiting appearance
discrimination is a first crucial step in starting the process. Additionally, by allowing employees
54

See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1070.
See id. (citing Marilynn B. Brewer & Rupert J. Brown, INTERGROUP RELATIONS in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 554 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998), who state that the preferences individuals have
regarding race, sex and ethnicity are also “deep rooted”).
56
See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1071 (giving examples of legal intervention which resulted in changes in attitudes
and practices towards African Americans through Plessy v. Ferguson and Brown v. Board of Education, attitudes
towards the disabled through the Americans Disabilities Act and attitudes towards gay and lesbian relationships
through statutes authorizing civil unions and domestic partnerships).
57
See id.
58
See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1071 and 1088-1089 (from claims of appearance discrimination lodged in Santa
Cruz, San Francisco, Madison, District of Columbia and Michigan).
59
See id. (citing figures based on complaints lodged under MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 37.2202(1)(A) (West
2008)).
60
See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1071.
55
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to bring claims against employers for discriminatory grooming and appearance policies, the idea
of litigation and negative media coverage will move employers to settle and end such policies.61
In sum, appearance is a viable category through which discrimination persists in the
workplace. While it influences and informs preferences in the private sphere, when it enters into
the public sphere it is subject to legal scrutiny. The lack of regulation enables employers to use
appearance based policies to guide workplace values on professionalism. This fuels invidious
forms of discrimination and helps create new manifestations of discrimination which do not
neatly fall within the Title VII proscribed categories. Most apparently, appearance policies and
standards of grooming have been influenced by a preference towards Anglo-American
appearance. Individuals who do not conform to such standards are susceptible to biases and
preconceived notions because they possess a different look, making the lack of regulation of
appearance based policies dangerous.

Part III:
Using Intersectionality Theory as a Tool by which to Broaden Title VII to
Recognize Appearance Discrimination in the Post 9/11 U.S.:
After 9/11, the backlash against Muslims in the workplace significantly increased as
employers policed and regulated the images of their employees in order to protect an all
American non-Muslim corporate image.62 When employees filed claims with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC, alleging discrimination based on religion and
national origin, employers defended their new policies on the grounds of legitimate business

61

See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1073 (noting the changes to both Harrah’s grooming policies and other
establishments due to pending litigation).
62
See McCandless & Ngo, supra note 9, at 3-8 (referencing statistics showing a sharp increase in workplace
discrimination Muslims after 9/11).
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concerns.63 Broadly, employers defended their policies, stating that post 9/11, without such
policies, their businesses would suffer due to a decline in customer satisfaction, confidence and
overall professionalism.64
In response to complaints filed by individuals alleging discrimination against them for
being Muslims, the EEOC added a chapter to their Compliance Manual in an attempt to prevent
employers from discriminating on the basis of national origins in a post 9/11 world.65 The
EEOC reiterated the prohibition of discrimination against individuals based upon their religion
and national origin, stating that aside from reasonably accommodating the religious practices of
employees, employers are prohibited from discriminating against employees based on their
“[p]hysical, linguistic or cultural traits [such as] their dress.”66 However, regardless of the
attempts made by EEOC to prevent invidious discrimination against particularly Muslim
employees or those perceived to be Muslim,67 most of the time such complaints have failed to
meet the requisite level of proof in order to constitute Title VII discrimination.
Claims brought by Plaintiffs under Title VII After 9/11:
Many cases alleging unlawful employment discrimination under Title VII after 9/11 have
been brought under religious discrimination. However, a majority of these are resolved at the
district level on summary judgment, finding for the employer.68 From the cases which were
dismissed on summary judgment, the ones which were appealed and moved to the Appellate
63

See Shirin Sinnar, Trends in Post 9/11 Backlash Employment Discrimination, Address Before the Equal
Employment Opportunity Law Panel (Mar. 23, 2005), available at http://www.bnabooks.com/ababna/eeo/2006/
sinnar.pdf. (stating legitimate business concerns included the adverse impact on a company’s public image and
adverse impact to customer relations).
64
See id.
65
See McCandless & Ngo, supra note 9, at 8-9.
66
See id. at 9.
67
See Sinnar, supra note 66 (generally indicating that in the post 9/11 era, discrimination, harassment and violence
against Sikhs have risen, because their beards and turbans were associated are being “Muslim”).
68
See McCandless & Ngo, supra note 9, at 12.
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level, the Courts overwhelmingly held that most of them involved “[n]ormal ‘workplace’
behavior and the alleged discriminatory events lacked a ‘direct nexus with religion.’”69 Even in
cases where Courts have determined that the plaintiffs did demonstrate that they suffered the
requisite level of severity or pervasiveness, they still have “…remanded cases for further
consideration [in order to determine whether or not] the evidence indicated that the plaintiff
suffered “religious harassment that was persistent, demeaning, unrelenting, and widespread.”70
This is particularly apparent in cases brought by Muslim women, alleging unlawful employment
discrimination based on their wearing of head coverings (hijabs) in the workplace.71
In Ali v. Alamo Rent-A-Car Inc., the District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint
where she alleged religious discrimination under Title VII based upon defendant-employer’s
policy which prohibited her from wearing a headscarf to work, on the grounds that a transfer to a
position which did not require contact with customers did not constitute an adverse employment
action.72 On appeal, plaintiff argued that discrimination based on religion is treated differently
because of Tile VII’s definition of religion and therefore does not require a showing of adverse
employment action taken by the employer.73 However, the Court rejected plaintiff’s argument.
Instead, the Court viewed the burden on employees to show discrimination on the basis of
religion as similar to their burden for showing discrimination based on sex, color, race or
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national origin.74 Therefore, the Court ruled that in simply failing to accommodate an
employee’s religious practice does not constitute religious discrimination under Title VII.75
However, the Court did not give adequate weight to the fact that plaintiff, a management
trainee who was hired to manage the front of the business, was transferred to a position where
she would not have to interact with customers, even though that was a main requirement of her
job and one of the main qualifications of her degree.76 Instead, since the employer did not
terminate plaintiff from her position, the Court held the adverse impact she experienced, did not
rise to the level of adverse employment action, as generally viewed in Title VII cases.77 The
Court failed to give credence to the idea that the employer discriminated against plaintiff based
on her appearance, because but for her head covering, according to the Court transcript, no other
reason was indicated for transferring plaintiff to a different position. The direct nexus between
the discriminatory conduct and religion would have been established, had the Court recognized
the existence of appearance based discrimination. The link would indicate the assumption that a
Muslim employee in a post 9/11 era, who is in a front desk position, should not “appear”
differently than the Anglo-American ideal preferred by society. Additionally, by appearing with
religious apparel, her religious identity became apparent which some customers found
unpalatable as they connected it with 9/11. In this case, assumptions based upon the employee’s
religion and sex become combined because she was publicly aligning herself with her religion,
by wearing the hijab and therefore her identity as a woman and Muslim both become open to
perceptions as a whole.
74
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In EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., the District Court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma the defendant, Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. brought forth a motion for
summary judgment, to dismiss a religious discrimination claim brought by a Muslim teenager
who applied for a job at an Abercrombie store in Woodland Hills Mall but was not hired.78
Plaintiff alleged she was not hired because she wore a head scarf, which was explicitly
prohibited “[b]y the Abercrombie ‘Look Policy, [which does not permit] sales models from
wearing head wear.”79 Ultimately, the District Court denied Abercrombie’s motion for summary
judgment, finding that they had not rebutted the plaintiff’s prima facie case and therefore
allowing plaintiff’s case to continue.80
However, even as the Court took a broad view of what constituted a deeply held religious
belief, the Court avoided setting such a precedent for treating religious- based discrimination
based on appearance in this manner. The Court’s analysis accomplished this in two ways. First,
footnote 12 of the decision cautioned that despite its decision, “Abercrombie may be able to
show undue hardship in other hijab cases.”81 In conjunction with the first point, in criticizing
Abercrombie’s “look policy,” the Court did not question the viability of Abercrombie’s “look
policy”. The decision was not so revolutionary because the Court failed to recognize the validity
of discrimination based on appearance as it did not view the “look policy” as setting forth a
particular standard of appearance to which exceptions, while permitted, are mostly not granted.82
By failing to recognize the inherently discriminatory policy put in place by Abercrombie,
the Court focused on the plaintiff’s head dress as a symbol of her religious beliefs, setting the
78
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stage for the ultimate dismissal of the action.83 This occurred because plaintiff could not
demonstrate that wearing a head dress is a “bona fide religious belief” within the definition set
forth under Title VII,84 as neither Islamic teachings nor religious observance directly require
women to cover their heads, which Courts focus on in deciding religious discrimination cases.85
In addition, plaintiff was unable to defeat claims of undue hardship asserted by her employer, as
Courts since 2001 have accepted most reasons as legitimate and leading to “…more than a de
minimus cost” thereby exempting the employer from accommodating the religious belief of an
employee.86 The only way to recognize and ultimately allow a plaintiff to prevail against an
appearance or look policy such as Abercrombie & Fitch’s, would be to recognize: (i) the
pervasiveness of appearance discrimination and (ii) its ability to become intertwined with
traditional forms of discrimination, creating a new hybrid form of discrimination which cannot
be remedied by traditional methods.
Using Intersectionality Theory to Identify New Hybrid Forms of Discrimination:
In order to curtail new forms of discrimination, which manifest themselves through
appearance-based policies in an employment context, new hybrid forms of discrimination need
to gain recognition as viable forms through which employers discriminate against employees.
Legal recognition is a precursor to providing legal remedies for such forms of discrimination. A
method which recognizes the existence and problems posed to the legal rights of employees
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through hybrid forms of discrimination is Intersectionality Theory, espoused by Professor
Kimberle Crenshaw.87
Professor Crenshaw suggests that there is a “problematic consequence [with treating]
race and gender and mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis,”88 in antidiscrimination studies. By viewing “race” and “sex” as separate categories and therefore
separate modes through which discrimination is perpetrated, the analytical framework only
accepts that individuals experience discrimination because of one aspect of identity, i.e. race or
sex. Framing discrimination through, as Professor Crenshaw terms, a “single-axis framework,”89
precludes individuals from obtaining relief for discrimination claims which do not fall within the
aforementioned neatly structured categories. Working within a one-dimensional view of
discrimination “marginalizes [individuals] who are multiply-burdened and obscured claims that
cannot be understood as resulting from discrete sources of discrimination.”90
To illustrate the problems which arise by not recognizing the intersection between race
and sex in the legal sphere, Professor Crenshaw focuses on judicial treatment of Black women
plaintiffs by the Courts in Title VII cases.91 Professor Crenshaw’s discussion of three cases92
highlights the inability of Courts to recognize hybrid forms of discrimination, because plaintiffs
“cannot combine statutory remedies to create a new ‘super-remedy’ which would give them
87
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relief beyond what the drafters of the relevant statues intended,”93 The Court declined to accept
that a combination of both sex and race discrimination can be brought by a group of plaintiffs
whose discrimination claim is only viable because of the intersection and resulting experiences
which stem from race and sex.94 The Court interpreted the plaintiffs’ bringing sex and race
discrimination as a single cause of action, as creating “new classes of protected minorities
[created only through the] mathematical principles of permutation and combination”, for the sole
purpose of increasing their standing.”95 This perspective misses the point entirely. Plaintiffs did
not push to bring a discrimination claim on the basis of sex and race in order to obtain greater
standing. Instead, they pushed, because independently, their status as women and status as
Blacks, did not entitle them protection under Title VII since General Motors employed both
white women and black men.96 Therefore, while there would be no independent grounds to
prove it, the employer logically could not discriminate against Black women because both of
their “identities” independently were not discriminated against by General Motors.
The Court’s failure to conceptualize discrimination in a multi-dimensional way is also
problematic because it assumes a white-centric notion towards different types of
discrimination.97 While Moore, a Black female plaintiff was unable to bring forth her
discrimination claim as a black woman because her race would not allow her to represent white
women employees, Professor Crenshaw argues that white women employees are not thought to
be prohibited from bringing forward sex discrimination claims, because their race prevents them

93

See DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp 142 at 143.
See id. at 145 (asserting that “the goal of [Title VII] was [not] to create a new classification of ‘black women’
who would have greater standing than, for example, a black male”).
95
See DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp 142 at 145.
96
See Kimberle Crenshaw, supra note 93, at 59.
97
See Moore, 708 F.2d at 480 (where, because plaintiff asserted a cause of action under Title VII as a Black female,
because of her reliance on both sex and race, her claim was dismissed because her race would not allow her to
‘adequately represent’ white women employees).
94

21

from understanding the experiences of women of other races.98 Therefore, Courts pegged
standards for demonstrating discrimination in sex and race discrimination cases based on the
discrimination and experiences felt by white individuals.99 Presenting this as the general norm or
standard through which discrimination claims under Title VII are assessed, disadvantages
minorities. By failing to recognize their particular experiences stemming from the intersection of
their race and sex, plaintiffs are doubly disadvantaged, since they are prevented from presenting
their claims in an effective manner.100 In Moore, unable to bring a claim on the behalf of all
women and all Blacks, in order to demonstrate unlawful discrimination on the grounds that the
employer would not promote African women employees, she could only rely on statistical
evidence relating to the promotions given to Blacks and not Black women, of which there were
little to none promoted.101 Limiting the plaintiff from the relevant evidence in order to state her
Title VII claim, the Court essentially “erased”102 her unique experiences and right to raise a
complaint.
A one-dimensional view of discrimination presents contradictions in the law.103 In
reviewing the Courts decisions in DeGraffenreid and Moore, she notes that Black women are
viewed inconsistently by the law, as the former decision “refused to acknowledge that the
employment of Black women can be distinct from that of white women, while [in the latter],
98
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Black women were harmed because [their] claims were…so distinct from the claims of white
women.”104 Such contradictions towards Black women, Professor Crenshaw stipulates, are
somewhat resolved by viewing discrimination as multi-dimensional, where an individual can
experience discrimination from a single or many different directions.105 Only recognizing one
single form through which discrimination can occur, disables the relief available to Black women
and limits their legal identity. While they share experiences with both white women and Black
men, they experience a unique, hybrid form of discrimination stemming from “the combined
effects of practices which discriminate on the basis of race and on the basis of sex.”106 Since
Black women are able to experience discrimination on the basis of two types of invidious
classifications (their race and their sex), their ability claim discrimination on both of their legal
identities, should logically be recognized.
In sum, Professor Crenshaw advocates that in order to recognize discrimination against
Black women based on the intersection of their sex and race-based identities, discrimination
needs to be viewed as multi-dimensional. Rather than recognizing new classes of minorities,
legally accepting hybrid forms of discrimination based on dual classifications such as sex and
race, which have historically been intertwined, is the most viable way to protect individuals who
fall outside of the purview and thus protections offered by Title VII. While primarily used in
race studies, I propose an extension to this theory towards two other historically intertwined
categories: sex and religion.
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Critiques of Intersectionality Theory:
Contrary to Professor Crenshaw’s proposal to remedy the approach to discrimination,
many scholars doubt the viability of intersectionality theory.107 The main critique which scholars
articulate is the lack of a clearly defined intersectional methodology affecting the theory’s
viability. This is so because in accepting the existence of the interaction of multiple individual
identities without recognizing a way to understand these intersections, remedies for intersectional
based discrimination are severely limited.108 As Nash asserts, “[w]hile intersectionality has
worked to disrupt [historical] approaches to identity…and problematize social processes of
categorization through [a focus on] marginalized subjects’ experiences, intersectional projects
often replicate precisely the approaches that they critique.”109 Focusing on Professor Crenshaw’s
discussion of the intersection of race and sex in discrimination claims, Nash questions the
limitating of black women’s identities solely to race and gender.110
While a relevant critique, Professor Crenshaw’s use of the Black woman as a type of
doubly-discriminated against subject while potentially unifying the experiences of all black
women, must be regarded in a contextual basis. Owing to her focus on race-based politics and
identity, she focused on the intersection between race and sex. However, she does not indicate
that additional burdens do not play a role in disadvantaging black women. Within the context of
anti-discrimination law under Title VII however, the intersection between race and sex serve as

107

See Jennifer C. Nash, Re-Thinking Intersectionality, 89 FEMINIST REV. 1, 2 (2008).
See Robert S. Chang & Jerome M. Culp, After Intersectionality, 71 U. MO.-KAN. CITY. L. REV. 485, 485-486
(2002).
109
See Jennifer C. Nash, supra note 108, at 6 (discussing the inconsistency in intersectionality theory with a focus
on Professor Kimberle Crenshaw’s discussion of the treatment of sex and race based claims in anti-discrimination
law).
110
See id. at 7 (arguing that while Professor Crenshaw argues for the law to recognize black women and doublyburdened in discrimination claims, she does not examine the other ways in which they are disadvantaged, such as
through sexuality, nationality, or class).
108

24

the two most important indicators and precursors of the biases and attitudes leading to
discrimination, which is why both of the aforementioned categories are Professor Crenshaw’s
main focus. In addition, for a black woman, the legal basis upon which unlawful discrimination
in the workplace occurs would be mainly geared towards her identity as a woman and her
identity as African-American.111
Another critique leveled at Professor Crenshaw’s discussion on intersectionality theory is
her focus on the black woman, as a “unitary and monolithic entity.”112 However, in the narrow
context of anti-discrimination law, the “black woman” is a prototype. It serves as a medium for
understanding intersectionality theory. While intersectionality may be problematic if viewed
solely as a means to advance black feminism,113 as a broader notion, it allow for the law to take
into account the cultural, social, religious, race and other identities which make-up individuals.
This in theory should permit discriminations claims to be broadly tailored to reach all types of
plaintiffs.
Recognizing the Intersection between Sex and Religion to Address a new hybrid form of
discrimination
As with race and sex, the religious and sex based identities of women allow for shared
experiences which develop as a result of both of their identities. In evaluating post 9/11
discrimination claims against Muslim women, the combination of religion and sex serves as a
dual basis for employment discrimination. As the law does not recognize this intersection, Title
VII provides no legal recourse and thus such plaintiffs are doubly-discriminated against and
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marginalized. Recognition of this link is crucial in increasing Title VII’s effectiveness against
discrimination perpetuated against minorities.114
Applying the principles of Intersectionality, there is an intersection between sex and
religion in appearance based policies implemented by employers. Accepting that an intersection
exists between sex and religion presents a viable alternative to achieving a two-fold goal. It aids
in analyzing hybrid forms of discrimination in the workplace and simultaneously legitimizes the
need for remedying these new hybrid forms of discrimination. The intersection demonstrates
that women with deeply held religious beliefs, which manifest themselves through appearance,
experience discrimination which is not “[w]ithin the traditional boundaries of [religion] or
gender discrimination as these boundaries are currently understood and [the]
intersection…factors into the lives of [religious] women in ways that cannot be captured wholly
by looking at [religion] or gender dimensions of those experiences separately.”115
As with the Court’s assessment of discrimination claims brought by plaintiffs on the
grounds of sex and race, without giving credence to the idea that the discrimination on the
grounds of religion and sex has a different impact compared to discrimination on either category,
Title VII does not provide adequate grounds through which plaintiffs can seek redress.116
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Part IV:
Amending Title VII to Remedy Discrimination Claims based on a
Combination of Religion and Sex
Recognizing the existence of appearance discrimination and its ability to be used as a
vehicle through which to effectuate employment discrimination, it is necessary to amend Title
VII to reflect such changes. Prohibitions on appearance discrimination can and have taken shape
through statutory ordinances in different states. However, due to a lack of enforcement, their
impact is smaller than anticipated.117 In order for such prohibitions to be more effective, Title
VII itself should be amended to include appearance discrimination based on religious
stereotypes, as unlawful discrimination in an employment context.
Examining the language of the various ordinances banning appearance discrimination in
an employment context, serves as a tool to determine how to fashion an effective amendment to
Title VII. Most jurisdictions which have prohibited some form of appearance discrimination in
the workplace through ordinances, focus on discrimination based on height and weight.118 The
remedies available to employees who face discrimination based on their height and weight
differs, depending upon the severity of the discrimination and whether or not jurisdictions have
only civil or criminal penalties available.119 However, as Rhode asserts, while cities such as San
Francisco and states such as the District of Columbia included in their human rights law,120
discrimination in the workplace based on personal appearance, “[t]hey have reported relatively
little enforcement activity despite…broad remedial provisions.”121
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The language used in the District of Columbia’s ordinance prohibiting discrimination,
including those based on appearance, would be useful if placed instead in Title VII. While Title
VII bars unlawful employment discrimination based on sex, race, color, religion and national
origin122, in order to prohibit appearance-based discrimination, additional language such as
“[d]iscrimination by reason of…personal appearance” is required.123 Personal appearance, as
defined in the statute includes “the outward appearance of any person…with regard to bodily
condition or characteristics, manner or style of dress and manner or style of personal grooming,
including, but not limited to hair style and beards,”124
However, the broad scope of the ordinance’s definition of personal appearance could
prove overly burdensome on employers who would be faced with the prospect of litigation over
anything termed personal appearance.125 This is one of the main reasons, arguably, why the
violations for discrimination based on personal appearance are not as strictly enforced despite the
broad remedial powers granted in the ordinance and do not survive motions to dismiss.126 There
is a need to effectively amend Title VII, using a narrowly tailored definition of what constitutes
religious apparel and symbols. In doing so, the interests of employees who adorn religious
outerwear would be protected, without unduly burdening employers by subjecting them to
frivolous lawsuits and ambiguous legislation.
Alternatively, personal appearance could be defined in a manner similar to the local
ordinance in Howard County, Maryland, which included within personal appearance to
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“[e]ncompass ‘outward appearance of a person with regard to hair style, facial hair, physical
characteristics or manner of dress.’”127 The ordinance further stipulated exceptions to
prohibiting discrimination in the workplace based on personal appearance should be cleanliness
of an individual as well as their work attire.128
However, it is espoused that an amendment to Title VII should include language
stipulating that discrimination based on personal appearance, which reflects on religious
stereotyping should be prohibited. Adding such a caveat to a definition of personal appearance
will target policies which discriminate based on appearance in the workplace, and will allow
employers to set reasonable appearance policies without impinging on the religious and other
deeply held beliefs of their workers. Grooming policies and professional codes of conduct
should not include the following categories as reflecting “clean cut” appearances: braided hair,
weaves, hair extensions, head coverings, yarmulkes, corn rolls, turbans and beards. This will
allow the amendment to achieve the maximum benefit for plaintiff-employees without unduly
burdening employers. While the aforementioned list is not exhaustive, it demonstrates that
essentially, an amendment to Title VII prohibiting discrimination based on religious apparel
should contain within it a list of recognized religious apparel and symbols.
Listing the particular religious apparel which cannot be used in job evaluations, employee
assessments or in creating professional codes of conduct would put employers on notice as to
what would constitute discrimination. Additionally, a list of religious symbols aids in
discrimination causes of action because the presence or absence of such religious apparel would
allow a plaintiff to establish a presumption of religious and sex based discrimination by way of
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appearance. Conversely, employers would be required to show a business necessity limited to
the health and safety of its other employees, to rebut this presumption and therefore, in theory,
only viable claims of discrimination would proceed through the judicial system. Referencing the
loss of sales and dissatisfaction of customers without additional evidence should not be
considered credible by the Courts. A list of religious symbols which employers should not be
able to consider in employment policies should be limited to those used “[w]ith regard to hair
style, facial hair, physical characteristics or manner of dress.”129
In sum, an amendment to Title VII which would enable plaintiffs to have standing to
pursue hybrid discriminatory claims based on the overall experiences that stem from their
religion and sex, would be extremely beneficial. It would improve their ability to pursue a cause
of action tailored to their specific discrimination without being barred from accessing relevant
statistics and other evidence. Additionally, it would allow for some form of appearance based
discrimination to be recognized as discrimination within the scope of discrimination discourse as
being invidious in nature. The most obvious and invidious form of religious and sex based
discrimination occurs through stereotypes stemming from society’s perception of appearance.
Outward manifestations of religious belief aid in influencing perceptions and the formation of
such stereotypes. Stereotypes and perceptions which lead to discrimination based upon the
religious appearance of individuals in an employment context and cannot be tolerated. In order
to best protect the rights of female employees with deeply held religious beliefs in the workplace,
an amendment to Title VII is required.
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